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Abstract 
 
This paper characterizes how a target firm should be sold when the possible 
buyers (bidders) have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We find that the 
optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which 
imposes a bias against bidders with high toeholds. This discriminatory 
procedure is such that the target´s average sale price is increasing in both the 
size of the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes. It is 
also shown that a simple mechanism of sequential negotiation replicates the 
main properties of the optimal procedure and yields a higher average selling 
price than the standard auctions commonly used in takeover battles. 
 
 
Keywords: optimal auctions, takeovers, toeholds, asymmetric auctions 
JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82, G32, G34 
 
                                                           
∗
 I am especially indebted to M. Angeles de Frutos for her comments and guidance. I would also like 
to thank the comments by Rafael Crespí and the participants in the XV Foro de Finanzas (Palma de 
Mallorca, 2007). A preliminary version of this work entitled "Optimal Auctions with Crossholdings" 
received helpful suggestions from Juan José Dolado, Juan José Ganuza, Pau Olivella, Sander Onderstal, 
Georges Siotis and the participants in the XXII Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Barcelona, 2006) and 
the 2007 ENTER Jamboree (Mannheim, 2007). The usual disclaimer applies. 
†
 Correspondence to: C. Madrid 126, Getafe, Madrid, Spain. 28903. E-mail: gloyola@eco.uc3m.es. 
 
1 Introduction
Auctions in which bidders have stakes in the sellers surplus are not rare in the
real world, as there are many examples that resemble a bidding competition with
vertical toeholds. Takeover contests provide one of the clearest illustrations, since
block shareholders compete among themselves or with an outside investor to gain
the control of a company, while the minority shareholders play the role of pure
sellers.1
In order to illustrate some of the features of takeover battles, consider the next real
life example. In 2006, the Spanish tollway operator Europistas was the target of a
takeover battle between two bidders. Firstly, the group Isolux Corsán submitted
an o¤er for 100% of the ownership, consisting of 4.8 euros per share. At this
stage, Cintra, one of the principal block shareholders of the target rm, attained
an agreement with Isolux. According to the deal, Cintra committed itself to
participate in this tender o¤er and sell irrevocably its 27.1 per cent stake for a
price of 5.13 euros per share. In less than 24 hours, a second buyer emerged: a
bidding consortium formed by the constructor conglomerate Sacyr Vallehermoso
and three Basque saving banks grouped in the society Telekutxa. While Isolux
Corsán was an outside bidder, Telekutxa held a 32.4 per cent stake in the capital
of Europistas. The nal tender o¤er of this consortium rose to 9.15 euros per
share, that is, an improvement of 78.36% with respect to the rst o¤er. This
implied that Cintra was trapped in the pre-sale agreement reached with Isolux,
which impeded it from taking advantage of the substantially better tender o¤er
made by the consortium led by Sacyr. Finally, Cintra paid 131 million euros to
Isolux as a compensation to recover its freedom to sell its stake to the bidding
consortium, which was the winner of the contest and thus, took over Europistas.
This case highlights some interesting issues. First, unlike standard auctions,
the presence of vertical toeholds introduces countervailing incentives on bidders
because they can get a payo¤not only when they win, but also when they lose the
auction. In fact, since the losing bidder owns a proportion of the sellers surplus,
he cares about the payment received by the seller. In the context of a takeover
battle, as the winner bidder must buy all the shares, losing transforms a bidder
with a toehold into a minority seller. This implies that, conditional on losing, a
toehold induces a more aggressive bidding behavior. In addition, holding stakes
in the target rm also means, by comparison with the outside bidders, lower costs
1Other examples are creditorsbidding in bankruptcy auctions, or the negotiation of a part-
nerships dissolution. Also, a situation in which rms are related vertically, e.g. if a buyer rm
hold shares in a supplier rm.
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of overbidding when winning, as the amount of shares to be bought is smaller.
Consequently, toeholds strengthen the standard incentive to increase bids present
in any auction, but now with the intention of selling at a higher price.2 Second,
the aforementioned Europistas case illustrates the large costs that an incorrect
choice of selling procedure may impose on the nonbidding shareholderswealth.3
Nonbidding shareholders of a target company - by means of the board of directors
or a special committee - should therefore pay attention to the selling mechanism
to be used.
The auction literature has studied takeovers using di¤erent valuation environ-
ments, but assuming always that signals are independently distributed. The
main conclusion is that the more aggressive bidding behavior induced by toeholds
leads to the break-down of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson 1981,
Riley and Samuelson 1981) even when bidders possess symmetric stakes. As a
result, the equivalence between standard auctions no longer holds, as several pa-
pers have shown. In particular, Singh (1998), when analyzing a game in which
a toehold bidder and an outside bidder compete to gain control of a company in
a private values framework, has shown the superiority of the second-price auction
over the rst-price auction. The major insight stemming from his model is what
he calls the owners curse. According to this phenomenon, the higher aggressive-
ness of the toeholder is so that in the second-price auction he is (rationally) willing
to bid more than his valuation. Since this overbidding behavior is absent in the
rst-price auction due to the traditional trade-o¤ present in this mechanism, the
non-equivalence between both standard auctions emerges.4 Bulow, Huang and
Klemperer (1999) also study a two-bidder takeover contest, but under a common
value set-up.5 They compare the sealed-bid rst-price and the ascending-price
(equivalent to the second-price one) auctions in both the symmetric and the asym-
metric cases. They show that with symmetric toeholds, the ascending auction
performs better than the rst-price auction in terms of the expected selling price
per share. In contrast, when analyzing the asymmetric case, they nd the opposite
2In the context of the Europistas case, it is possible to conjecture about the source of the
large price di¤erence observed between the two o¤ers. It seems plausible to argue that this gap
reected not only a higher valuation from the toehold bidder (the consortium headed by Sacyr),
but also a more aggressive bidding behavior than that exhibited by the outside bidder (Isolux).
3The price di¤erence of both tender o¤ers (147 millions of euros) represented about eight
times the annual net prots of Cintra.
4Ettinger (2002) conrms the dominance of the second-price auction over the rst-price
auction in terms of the expected sale price when buyers have symmetric stakes in the sellers
surplus.
5They study takeovers among nancial bidders for which, as the authors point out, the
common values environment seems more appropiate.
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result whenever toeholds are very asymmetric and su¢ ciently small.6
The current paper does also deal with the issue of how to run a takeover battle.
But in sharp contrast with the previous literature, our work is, to the best of
our knowledge, pioneering in that it adopts a normative approach rather than
a positive one. That is, instead of taking a particular auction format as given
for exogenous reasons, we analyze how the maximizing target price mechanism
should be and how it could be implemented. To this end, our methodology
follows the mechanism design approach, introduced by Myerson (1981), within an
independent private values framework.
Two main features of our model are the possibility of asymmetry among bid-
ders toeholds and the existence of a bidder without toeholds (outside bidder).
The analysis performed here is in close connection with Loyola (2007), a compan-
ion paper that characterizes the optimal mechanism in the presence of horizontal
crossholdings, i.e., toeholds in other biddersprots. In contrast with this case, we
nd that in the presence of vertical toeholds, the optimal allocation rule imposes
no bias against any bidder as the presence of vertical toeholds only links the bid-
derspayments, but not the biddersvaluations. As a consequence, a maximizing
revenue seller prefers a symmetric equilibrium even though buyers hold asymmet-
ric stakes. It is shown however that this optimal rule needs to be implemented
by a non-standard auction. In particular, we prove that the implementation is
possible through a second-price auction augmented with a reserve price and a
scheme of asymmetric payments. The latter includes a penalty against the win-
ner (with respect to the non-toehold case) and a payment by the loser whenever
he is a toehold bidder. The reason for this apparent contradiction between the
allocation rule and the scheme of payments is the same as that behind the failure
of the Revenue Equivalence Principle. That is, the presence of toeholds implies
the impossibility of fully characterizing the revenues based only on the allocation
rule and the payment made by the lowest-type bidder. With toeholds, the entire
system of transfers plays a role to characterize revenues.
Our discriminatory policy has the following rationale. By imposing a heavier bias
against the toehold bidder, the optimal mechanism extracts more surplus from the
strongest player in the game. In the context of takeovers, this advantaged player
corresponds to the raider who bids more aggressively due to his larger stake in
the target. As a result, the discriminatory rule pays the seller, as we show that
6These contrasting ndings rest on two facts. First, the negative e¤ect of the winners curse
on biddersaggressiveness is larger in asymmetric ownership structures. Second, the rst-price
auction involves an allocation rule that is less sensitive to the distortions caused by the presence
of toeholds.
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the expected selling price is increasing in both the common toehold (the symmet-
ric case) and in the degree of asymmetry in these stakes (the asymmetric case).7
In addition, we show that a sequential negotiation procedure replicates the main
properties of the optimal mechanism. This negotiation-based procedure sets an
agenda of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers that gives priority to the more aggressive bidder,
i.e., the toeholder, and thus yields a higher targets expected sale price than both
the rst-price and the second-price auctions.8 The last result is in line with the
established superiority of sequential mechanisms which give priority to stronger
bidders. Povel and Singh (2006), for instance, analyze takeover contests under a
general value setting that allows both private and common value environments.
They characterize the optimal selling procedure that a target company should de-
sign when it faces two outside bidders (without toeholds) who are asymmetrically
informed. Interestingly, Povel and Singh also conclude about the optimality of
imposing a heavier bias against the strongest bidder (the better-informed one) by
means of a two-stage procedure. Similarly, Dasgupta and Tsui (2003) examine
in an interdependent value setting the properties of the "matching auction", a
sequential procedure where the rst mover is also the strong bidder. In their
model, the strong player can be either the larger-toehold bidder or the better-
informed one. As with our sequential procedure, Dasgupta and Tsui also nd
that the matching auction allows the targets seller to obtain a higher expected
transaction price than with the standard auctions, but only when asymmetry
is su¢ ciently large. An important di¤erence between the last two papers and
ours, apart from the valuation environment adopted, lies in the mechanism it-
self, which implies biddersparticipation strategies of di¤erent nature. Povel and
Singh (2006) propose a hybrid sequential procedure that combines standard auc-
tions and exclusive deals. Similarly, in the auction-based mechanism studied by
Dasgupta and Tsui (2003), the rst mover bidder actively follows a bid strategy,
whereas the second one only decides whether or not match this bid. In contrast,
our procedure is based upon a scheme of take-it or leave-it o¤ers made by the
seller so that all bidders are in some sense passive players.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of takeover contests
in the presence of toeholds. In Section 3, the optimal selling mechanism is
7This revenue-increasing property of an optimal discriminatory policy has also been found in
contests with asymmetric informed buyers (see Povel and Singh 2004, Povel and Singh 2006).
8In light of this nding, the Europistas case provides then a clear example of how things
should not be done when selling a target rm in which one of the shareholders could become
a bidder. Of course, in this case the nonbidding shareholder (Cintra) chose incorrectly to
negotiate and close a deal rst with the outside bidder (Isolux) instead of doing it previously
with the toehold bidder (the consortium). In this paper we show that an appropriate sequential
negotiation mechanism should take the opposed order of negotiations.
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characterized and its main properties are established. In Section 4, we propose
a simple negotiation procedure that replicates most of these properties. The
next section compares this negotiation-based mechanism with the auction formats
commonly used in practice. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and stress some
policy implications. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The nonbidding shareholders of a target company (the seller), represented by the
board of directors or a special committee, face a takeover threat from two possible
risk-neutral buyers (the bidders). The value of the target to bidder i is ti, which
is private information, but it is common knowledge that it is independently and
identically drawn according to c.d.f. F with support

t; t

, density f and hazard
rate H(ti) = f(ti)=(1   F (ti)).9 Denote the value that the initial shareholders
assign to the target company by t0, which is common knowledge and is here
normalized to zero.10
A toehold of bidder i is dened as a partial participation of this bidder in the
sellers surplus, or, equivalently, a partial participation in the ownership of the
target company. We assume that bidder 1 has a larger initial stake in the sellers
surplus than bidder 2. The parameter i represents the share of bidder i in the
sellers surplus. Thus, (1 1 2) represents the participation of the seller in her
surplus. Toeholds are assumed common knowledge, with 1=2 > 1  2  0.11
We will also refer to the players as follows: a bidder with toehold as a bidding
shareholder (or toehold bidder), a bidder without toehold as an outside bidder
(or non-toehold bidder) and the seller as the nonbidding shareholder. Given this
ownership structure, we interpret t0 as the common value that all shareholders
assign to the rm when they own it partially. In other words, t0 represents the
value that all shareholders assign to the rm under the current management, i.e.,
either before the takeover takes place or when this process is nally unsuccessful.
9As it is standard in auction theory, we concentrate on the regular case, that is, increasing
hazard rates.
10As we will see below, the seller may not be an exclusive initial owner.
11Notice that this formulation allows the presence of an outside bidder (non-toeholder), which
is precisely the case analyzed in Section 5, given its predominance in actual takeovers. Bradley
et al. (1988) nd that 66% of the bidders in their sample of 236 successful tender o¤ers have
zero toeholds, while Betton and Eckbo (2000) nd that 47% of initial bidders in their sample
of over 1,300 tender o¤ers (including failed ones) have zero toeholds (see Goldman and Qian
(2005)).
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In contrast, we understand ti to be the private value that bidder i assigns to the
target when he owns it fully. In consequence ti can be interpreted as a private
synergy that bidder i can exploit when he wins the contest and obtains absolute
control of the company. It is also called the value "to run the rm".12 Implicit
in this interpretation is the assumption that the takeovers modeled in the present
paper are not partial. That is, all shareholders must sell their stakes to the
winning contestant (and he must buy it) according to the price stated by the
contests rules.
3 The Optimal Mechanism
Due to to the revelation principle, we only need to focus on direct revelation
mechanisms. Denote the vector of signals realizations by t, i.e., t = (t1; t2), and
similarly, denote by t i the vector of signal realizations of all bidders except bidder
i. Let T and T i be the support of t and t i, respectively.13 Dene pi(t) as the
probability with which the optimal mechanism allocates the target company to
bidder i, conditional on the vector of reported signal realizations t, and, dene
xi(t) as the transfer from bidder i to the seller, conditional on the same vector.
Let Qi(ti) be bidder is conditional probability of winning given that his type is
ti, i.e., Qi(ti) 
R
T i
pi(ti; t i)f(t i)dt i. Bidder is expected payo¤, conditional
on signal ti and announcement bti, is then given by14
Ui(bti=ti)  Z
T i
[(tipi   (1  i)xi) + ixj] f(t i)dt i
for all ti;bti 2 t; t and for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. We dene bidder is truthtelling
payo¤ as Vi(ti)  Ui(ti=ti) and the sellers expected revenue when all bidders
report their true type as follows15
U0 
2X
i=1
Z
T
(1  1   2)xi(t)f(t)dt. (1)
12Alternatively, since we have normalized t0 = 0, ti can be interpreted as an incremental cash
ow generated by the new control and management under bidder i (See Singh, 1998).
13In our set-up t i is just tj : We have opted for the notation t i since the characterization of
the optimal mechanism can be easily extended to the case of more than two bidders. For the
three bidder case (two asymmetric toeholders and one outside bidder) the characterization can
be obtained from the author upon request.
14For the sake of presentation, we have omitted the arguments of pi and xi, but it should be
clear that pi = pi(bti; t i) and xi = xi(bti; t i), for all i.
15This function is similar to that dened for the nonbidding shareholders by Bulow, Huang
and Klemperer (1999) in the context of a takeover contest with common values.
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Let us dene ci(ti), bidder is marginal revenue,16 as
ci(ti)  ti   1
H(ti)
for all i:
Following Myerson (1981) (see more details in the Appendix), it can be shown
that the optimal mechanism solves the following problem:17
max
pi;Vi(t)
2X
i=1

 Vi(t) +
Z
T
ci(ti)pi(t)f(t)dt

(2)
s:t:
Vi(t)  0; for all i. (3)
Q0i(ti)  0 for all ti 2

t; t

and for all i. (4)
2X
i=1
pi(t)  1 and pi(t)  0, for all i and for all t 2 T , (5)
where (3) is a su¢ cient condition for bidder is participation constraint to hold, (4)
is a su¢ cient condition for the incentive compatibility constraints of the bidders
to hold and (5) corresponds to the feasibility constraints.
3.1 Optimal allocation rule
Lemma 3.1 The optimal mechanism sets Vi(t) = 0 and
pi(t) =

1 if ci(ti) > max f0;maxj 6=i cj(tj)g
0 otherwise
for all i, and for all t 2 T .
Note that bidder is marginal revenue is larger than bidder js if and only if
ti > zij(tj)  c 1i (cj(tj)) for all i 6= j. In addition, let us dene ti  c 1i (0) as the
threshold signal for which bidder is marginal revenue is larger than the sellers.
Since ci is well-behaved, so it is its inverse function, and thus it is equivalent to
say that the optimal mechanism sets Vi(t) = 0 and
pi(t) =

1 if ti > max fti ;maxj 6=i zij(tj)g
0 otherwise
(6)
16Bulow and Roberts (1989) provide an interpretation of ci(ti) as the bidder is marginal
revenue, instead of the bidder is virtual valuation concept dened by Myerson (1981).
17Notice that this problem is identical to the optimization program in Myerson (1981), who
does not consider the presence of toeholds.
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for all i, and for all t 2 T .
Lemma 3.1 establishes that, in the presence of vertical toeholds, the optimal
allocation rule is not a discriminatory one as the policy function satises that
zij(tj) = tj as ci(:) = c(:) for all bidders.18 This implies that even though
bidders possess asymmetric toeholds, it is revenue maximizing for the nonbidding
shareholders to o¤er them the same chances of winning whenever they report
the same signal value. This result is surprising because one would expect that,
since a vertical toehold induces a more aggressive bidding behavior, the seller
should take it into account to design the optimal rule. Our interpretation is
that, as opposed to horizontal crossholdings (see Loyola 2006), vertical toeholds
only impose links between the bidderspayments, but not between the bidders
valuations. Consequently, in the terminology of Bulow and Roberts (1989), the
marginal revenue function (which depends only on valuations) is the same for all
bidders. This implies that the seller perceives all bidders as symmetric players,
and hence, it is optimal to impose no bias and to attain a symmetric equilibrium.
However, as we will see in the next subsection, this optimal symmetric equilibrium
requires the seller to introduce an asymmetry into the payment scheme. The
underlying rationale for this apparent contradiction between the allocation rule
and the scheme of transfers is the same as the one behind the break-down of the
Revenue Equivalence Principle. That is, when toeholds exist, revenues do depend
on the entire payment scheme, not only on the transfers made by the lowest type
bidder. As a result, it does not su¢ ce to examine only the allocation rule to state
the properties of the optimal mechanism. In fact, one needs to characterize the
payment scheme fully as this is crucial in order to recognize the non-standard and
discriminatory nature of the optimal selling procedure.
3.2 Implementation
Since all bidders provide the same marginal revenue, the implementation of the
optimal allocation rule requires a scheme of payments that induce an e¢ cient allo-
cation, that is, one which guarantees that the target rm be awarded to the bidder
who values it the most. Since we have assumed that players are asymmetric in
their toeholds, and thus in their expected payo¤ functions, the only way to attain
an e¢ cient allocation is to design a scheme of personalizedpayments. This
implies that we must rule out any standard auction, as it imposes symmetric pay-
ments on the players and thus results in an asymmetric and ine¢ cient equilibrium.
18In the terminology introduced by Bulow and Roberts (1989), all bidders exhibit the same
marginal revenue function for the seller, who is interpreted as a monopolist.
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This fact is formalized in the next corollary.
Corollary 3.1 A standard auction cannot implement the optimal selling mecha-
nism.
From the incentive compatible constraint, we show next that the optimal alloca-
tion rule can be implemented by a selling mechanism with an asymmetric scheme
of transfers.
Proposition 3.1 In the presence of toeholds, the optimal mechanism can be im-
plemented by a modied second price auction with a reserve price and a scheme of
payments that includes a penalty against the winner and a payment by the loser.
The scheme is the following one:
xi(t) =
8<:
zi(t i) + [i   1] zi(t i) if pi(t) = 1
izj(t j) if pi(t) = 0 and pj(t) = 1
0 otherwise
for all i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, and for all t 2 T , where
i 
1  j
(1  i   j)
, i  i
(1  i   j)
,
and zi(t i) = inf fsi : ci(si)  0 and ci(si)  cj(tj)g.
This scheme of payments has the following properties.
Discriminatory policy with winning penalties and losing payments. First,
since zi(t i) > 0 and i  1, this implies that when the winner is a bidder with
toeholds, his payment has a penalty when compared to the payment he would
make in case of holding no toeholds. This penalty is given by [i   1] zi(t i). Sec-
ond, since zj(t j) > 0, and i  0, this means that when the loser is a bidder
with an initial stake, his payment is positive. Third, from 1 > 2, it follows
that 1 > 2 and 1 > 2. Thus, it is clear that the scheme of transfers proposed
imposes a discriminatory policy with a bias against the bidder with the largest
initial stake.19
19Moreover, this discriminatory policy gets exacerbated with the degree of asymmetry, as
the gaps of both winning penalties and losing payments are increasing with the di¤erence in
toeholds.
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Truthtelling and e¢ cient mechanism. The discriminatory scheme of winning
penalties and losing payments implies that the payo¤ of bidders 1 and 2 simplies
to
i(ti) =

ti   zi(t i) if pi(t) = 1
0 otherwise
The scheme of transfers therefore induces symmetric objective functions for all
bidders, as in the standard problem when there are no toeholds (see Myerson
1981).
Average sale price increasing with common toeholds and asymmetry.
First, let 0 be the sellers expected revenue under the optimal mechanism, and
hence, dene 0  0=(1   1   2), the average sale price under the same pro-
cedure. From (1) and Proposition 3.1, it follows directly that 0, and thus 

0,
are increasing with both the winning penalty and the losing payment. Second,
consider the symmetric toeholds case (i.e. 1 = 2 =  > 0). In this case,
both the winners penalty and the losers payment are increasing in the common
toehold, as it is easy to check that @i=@ > 0 and @i=@ > 0 for all i. All of
this implies that, at the optimal mechanism, the sellers expected revenue (and
thereby, the average sale price) is increasing with the size of common toeholds.
Finally, consider the asymmetric toeholds case (i.e. 1 > 2 > 0). Let us dene
"  1 2 so that the parameters of the winning penalty and the losing payment
can be rewritten as
1 =
1  2
1  22   "
; 2 =
1  2   "
1  22   "
1 =
2 + "
1  22   "
; 2 =
2
1  22   "
Hence, it is easy to verify that @i=@" > 0 and @i=@" > 0 for all i. Therefore,
the optimal mechanism is such that the sellers expected revenue (and thus, the
average sale price) is increasing with the degree of asymmetry in toeholds. All
of this implies that a discriminatory policy pays to the seller.
4 A sequential negotiation procedure
In this section we show that a simple sequential negotiation procedure replicates
the main properties of the optimal mechanism. The negotiation procedure works
as follows:
Stage I
11
I.1. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er 1 to bidder 1, where the o¤er i
is the price to be paid by bidder i for the target shares.
I.2. Bidder 1 accepts or rejects this o¤er. If he accepts, the target is sold to him
and the game is over. If bidder 1 rejects the exclusive deal, negotiation moves to
the next round.
Stage II
II.1. The seller makes a new take-it-or-leave-it o¤er 2 to bidder 2.
II.2. Bidder 2 accepts or rejects this o¤er. If he accepts, the target is sold to him.
Otherwise, the target company remains under the current ownership structure and
management.
The next proposition illustrates the discrimination policy resulting from the ne-
gotiation procedure for the uniformly distributed valuations case.20
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that ti is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] for
all i = 1; 2. At the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the
sequential negotiation procedure, it is optimal for the seller to set 1 > 

2 for all
1  2  0.
With sequential negotiations the sale price charged to the rst bidder is higher
than the one charged to the second bidder. As the rst-mover is the buyer with the
highest toehold, the sequential mechanism discriminates against him. Moreover,
the degree of this bias increases with the degree of asymmetry in the toeholds.
More precisely, if we dene the degree of asymmetry by "  1   2, then the
di¤erence in prices o¤ered by the seller, i.e., (2; ")  1   2; is increasing in
": To see this note that
(2; ")  1   2 =
1  22 + 4"
8(1  (2 + "))(1  2)
so that @(2; ")=@" > 0:
Note also that (2; ") is strictly increasing in 1 and strictly decreasing in 2;
with (2; ") strictly increasing in 2 for xed and given ": Hence, the negoti-
ation procedure highlights the importance of establishing an asymmetric scheme
of payments, as the price charged to the high-toehold bidder exceeds that of the
low-toehold one, and this bias is larger when the ownership stakes become more
asymmetric.
20For simplicity and wihout loss of generality, all the results in the paper are henceforth stated
assuming uniformly distributed valuations on the unitary interval.
12
To analyze whether this price discrimination policy pays to the seller we must look
at the average sale price delivered by the equilibrium of the sequential procedure.
Let SN0 be the sellers expected revenue under the sequential procedure, and
consequently, dene SN0  SN0 =(1   1   2), the average sale price under the
same mechanism.21 Rewriting SN0 in terms of " = 1   2, it follows that
SN0 =
1
16(1  2)2

(5  62)2
4(1  2   ")
+ 2 + "

:
It is easy to verify that @SN0 =@" > 0 for all 2; " 2 (0; 1=2) so that the average
sale price is increasing in the degree of asymmetry. This result is displayed in
Figure 1.
0.3750.250.1250
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
epsilon
Price
Figure 1. Average sale price from the sequential negotiation mechanism with two
bidders and 1> 2 0, for 2= 0 (solid line), 2 = :1 (dot line) and 2 = :4 (dash
line).
Furthermore, similarly to the optimal mechanism in the symmetric case, the afore-
dened sequential procedure yields an average sale price which is also increasing
in the common toehold. In fact, when 1 = 2 = , it is possible to check that
@SN0 =@ > 0 for all  2 (0; 1=2), as it is illustrated in Figure 2.
21See the Appendix (Proof of Proposition 4.1) for details on how this average price is com-
puted.
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Price
Figure 2. Average sale price from the sequential negotiation mechanism with two
bidders for 1= 2=   0.
Notice however, that unlike the optimal mechanism described in the previous sec-
tion, the sequential procedure always discriminates against the rst-mover bidder,
even if the toeholds are symmetric or zero. In fact, as the proof of Proposition
4.1 establishes, the prices charged to both players in the symmetric case (i.e.,
1=2 > 1 = 2 =   0) satisfy the following inequality
1 =
5  6
8(1  )2 >
1
2(1  ) = 

2
In addition, the di¤erent priorities given by the negotiation timetable to di¤erent
buyers implies that, unlike the optimal procedure, the sequential mechanism may
be ex post ine¢ cient.
In sum, and despite these di¤erences, our sequential procedure replicates the two
most important properties of the optimal mechanism: the expected selling price
is increasing in both the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in the
initial stakes held by bidders.
5 Sequential procedure vs. auctions
Although there is not a specic practice to sell a company, sometimes the legal
framework implicitely induces the board of directors to conduct an auction among
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the raiders.22 The underlying rationale behind this recommendation is the idea
that an auction run with several bidders at once o¤ers a more competitive envi-
ronment than a negotiation held with a single buyer at each round. Nevertheless,
and despite this idea, the coexistence of both types of mechanisms in real world
takeover processes has been widely documented.23 In this Section we compare
the sequential procedure to the auction formats commonly used in practice from
the nonbidding shareholderspoint of view. We show that the nonbidding share-
holders benet from the discrimination policy to the extent that the sequential
procedure generates a higher expected selling price than both the rst-price and
the second-price auctions.
We analyze here two ownership structures in which this result holds: (i) the
symmetric case, i.e. 1 = 2 =   0, and (ii) a particular asymmetric case
in which there are two classes of bidders: one toeholder and one outsider, i.e.,
1 > 2 = 0.
24 For both of these ownership structures, the literature provides a
ranking between the rst and second price formats. In the second-price auction,
and for both ownership environments, the toehold bidder exhibits the owners
curse, an overbidding behavior according to which the equilibrium bid exceeds
his valuation. This overbidding phenomenon is however not present in the case
of the outside raider, as bidding his true valuation continues to be a dominant
strategy for him. In contrast, given the traditional bidding trade-o¤ present in
the rst-price auction, the owners curse is absent in this selling format. Because
of this, the second-price auction outperforms the rst-price auction in terms of
revenue, in both the symmetric and asymmetric structures.25 As a result, it
su¢ ces to compare the selling price generated by the sequential mechanism with
that generated by the second-price auction.
The following auxiliary result characterizes the expected selling price in the second-
price auction.
Lemma 5.1 Let SPA0 be the average sale price resulting from the second-price
auction. Then,
22For instance, the Delaware law in the US establishes that the board must act as "auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company". See also
Cramton and Schwartz (1991).
23See the evidence provided by Boone and Mulherin (2003), Boone and Mulherin (2004), Povel
and Singh (2006), and Bulow and Klemperer (2007).
24As the evidence presented by Bradley et al. (1988), Betton and Eckbo (2000), and Betton
Eckbo and Thorburn (2005) suggests, the presence of an outside bidder is very common in actual
takeovers.
25Ettinger (2002) performs this comparison for the symmetric case, and Ettinger (2005) does
it for the specic asymmetric environment analyzed here.
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(1) In the symmetric case, this price is given by
SPA0 =
(1 + 2)(1  )
(1  2)(1 + )  
2
3(1  2)
(2) In the asymmetric case, it corresponds to
SPA0 =
1
1  1

1
1 + 1
  5
6
1  
1
21 + 2
+
2
31 + 3
+
1
6

Now, we establish the predominance of our sequential mechanism over the auction
formats commonly used in practice, irrespective of the degree of symmetry in
toeholds.
Proposition 5.1 The sequential procedure generates a higher average sale price
than both the rst-price and the second-price auctions, no matter the degree of
asymmetry.
As mentioned in the previous section, the sequential procedure always discrim-
inates against the rst-mover bidder. This fact implies that it yields a larger
expected sale price than both auction formats in the symmetric case, even when
there are no toeholds at all. The average sale price comparison for the symmetric
case between the second-price auction and our sequential mechanism is depicted
in Figure 3. Note from the gure that the second-price auction induces a concave
average sale price whereas the negotiation procedure exhibits a convex one. As a
result, the price gap between both mechanisms is larger when the toehold becomes
su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high. The di¤erence attains its minimum for values
around :25.
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0.50.3750.250.1250
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
phi
Price
Figure 3. Average sale price from the sequential negotiation mechanism (solid line)
and the SPA (dot line) with two bidders for 1= 2=   0.
Furthermore, the superiority of our sequential mechanism over auctions is exacer-
bated in the asymmetric case, as the discriminatory policy involves a sequence of
negotiations with a pecking order consistent with the aggressiveness of each buyer
(see Figure 4).
0.3750.250.1250
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
phi 1
Price
Figure 4. Average sale price from the sequential negotiation mechanism (solid line)
and the SPA (dot line) with two bidders for 1> 2= 0.
Notice that the clear advantage of the sequential mechanism becomes larger when
the degree of asymmetry (represented in this case by 1) increases. This is a con-
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sequence of the fact that whereas SN0 is always an increasing and convex function
in 1, 
SPA
0 is a concave function and an increasing one only for a su¢ ciently low
degree of asymmetry (for all 1 < :38).
This last result is formalized in the following statement.
Corollary 5.1 The larger the degree of asymmetry, the better the sequential pro-
cedure when compared with both the rst-price and the second-price auctions.
Finally, let us mention that our results here are in line with the well-established
supremacy of sequential mechanisms which give higher priority to stronger bid-
ders.26 Accordingly, and in contrast with the standard auction formats, the par-
ticular order of negotiations involved in our procedure allows for an exploitation
of the higher aggressiveness of raiders with larger stakes in the target.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have characterized how a target rm should be sold when bidders possess
prior stakes in its ownership. This optimal mechanism corresponds to a non-
standard auction with a scheme of asymmetric payments that imposes a bias
against toeholders. The rationale of such a discriminatory policy is the fact that
a standard mechanism is unable to induce a symmetric and e¢ cient allocation
rule, as it preserves the initial advantage of toehold bidders. In contrast, a
scheme of asymmetric winning penalties and losing payments allows both to take
advantage of the higher aggressiveness of toeholders and to go back to a symmetric
environment.
The presence of losing payments in the optimal procedure is in line with similar
results found in the literature devoted to characterizing optimal auctions when
externalities exist. For instance, Goeree et al. (2005) show that the positive
externalities present in fund-raising activities lead to discarding winner-pay auc-
tions in favor of all-pay formats. In a result reminiscent of ours, they establish
the optimality of an auction with a reserve price and payments by the losers - a
mix between participation fees and an all-pay auction run in a subsequent stage-,
which depend on the degree of the externality. Moreover, Goeree et al. (2005)
emphasize that some characteristics of this optimal procedure are present in the
26See Povel and Singh (2006) and Dasgupta and Tsui (2003).
18
procedures used for raising funds in the real world. As a consequence, the char-
acteristics of our non-standard auction in the takeover case are not far from those
exhibited by the optimal procedure in other contests with externalities.
We have also demonstrated that the nonbidding shareholders benet from the
discriminatory mechanism, as the target average sale price is increasing in both
the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes. The latter
nding is in sharp contrast with the properties of standard auction formats in
takeover battles, which then lead to opposite policy implications. For instance,
Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) show that in general the asymmetry in
toeholds lowers prices in common-value ascending auctions. As a result, they
recommend the "level the playing eld" practice, according to which it may be
revenue increasing to sell toeholds very cheaply to the buyer with the smaller stake
in the target. On the contrary, our normative approach suggests that the seller
should follow strategies with the aim of preserving this asymmetry. Accordingly,
the board of directors should block or discourage the entrance of new shareholders
suspected of becoming competitors against the incumbent toeholder in a future
takeover battle.
As an alternative to the optimal non-standard auction-based mechanism, we have
proposed a simpler and realistic negotiation procedure that replicates the main
properties of the rst one. This mechanism contains a timetable that gives pri-
ority to the higher-toehold bidders, but charges higher prices to them. Such a
negotiation-based procedure shares some features of other selling procedures al-
ready considered in the literature. In particular, it balances out properly the
trade-o¤ between creation and extraction of value caused by the implicit threats
involved in the sequential nature of the negotiation process. This characteristic
is also present in the posted-price rule discussed by Campbell and Levin (2006) in
an environment with interdependent valuations. These authors nd conditions
under which a hybrid mechanism of a posted-price rule and a random rationing
may outperform standard auctions. This fact occurs essentially when the in-
crease of all buyerswillingness to pay o¤sets the losses stemming from ex post
ine¢ cient allocations. Similarly, in the context of our paper, the individual and
sequential feature of the negotiation scheme imposes costs and benets on nonbid-
ding shareholders. On the one hand, the expected target price decreases due to
both less competition and less e¢ ciency. On the other hand, the higher priority
given to the high-toehold bidder increases his willingness to pay, as the oppor-
tunity of winning the contest emerges even though his value may be lower than
the small-toehold bidders one. We have proved that the last e¤ect dominates
the shortcomings, therefore keeping open the ongoing debate on auctions versus
negotiations in takeover wars.
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8 Appendix
Appendix A: The optimal mechanism problem.
The optimal mechanism solves the following problem:
max
xi2R; pi2[0;1]
U0 (7)
s:t:
Vi(ti)  0 8ti 2

t; t

; i = 1; 2 (8)
Vi(ti)  Ui(bti=ti) 8ti; bti 2 t; t ; i = 1; 2 (9)
2X
i=1
pi(t)  1 and pi(t)  0; i = 1; 2;8t 2 T (10)
where (7) is the sellers expected revenue, (8) is bidder is participation constraint,
(9) represents the incentive compatibility constraints of the bidders and (10) cor-
21
responds to the feasibility constraints.27 From Myerson (1981), standard sub-
stitutions and computations lead to state the equivalence between the incentive
compatibility constraints and the following two consitions
(i) @Vi(ti)
@ti
= Qi(ti)
(ii) @Qi(ti)
@ti
 0
These conditions allow to replace (9) by (ii) and
Vi(ti) = Vi(t) +
Z ti
t
Qi(si)dsi: (11)
Similarly, (8) is guaranteed to hold if Vi(t)  0 for all i. Hence, straightforward
computations allow us to rewrite the sellers expected payo¤ and to simplify the
maximization problem as presented in Section 3.
Appendix B: Proofs.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. From (2), it is in the sellers interest to make Vi(t) =
0 for all i because Vi(t) > 0 is suboptimal and setting Vi(t) < 0 violates the
Participation Constraint. Moreover, H 0(ti) > 0 implies that c0i(ti) > 0 and
thereby @pi(t)=@ti  0 , so that Q0i(ti)  0 is satised for all i. Finally, since
t0 = 0, the optimal allocation rule is found by comparing for a given t = (t1; t2)
the terms ci(ti), whenever they are positive. The solution sets then pi(t) = 1 i¤
ci(ti) > max f0;maxj 6=i cj(tj)g :
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For any vector t i consider
zi(t i) = inf fsi : ci(si)  0 and ci(si)  cj(tj) for all j 6= ig
for all i, i.e., the inmum of all winning values for i against t i. Then, in
equilibrium
pi(si; t i) =

1 if si > zi(t i)
0 if si < zi(t i)
(12)
and Z ti
t
pi(si; t i)dsi =

ti   zi(t i) if ti  zi(t i)
0 if ti < zi(t i)
(13)
27Following Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stachetti (1996) and (1999), it is possible to show that
the optimal threat for the non-participating bidder is that the target remains under the current
management and control. As a result, the outside utility for the lowest-type bidder is the same
for all buyers (toeholders and outsiders), and so, it can be normalized to zero (see Loyola 2007,
Section 3).
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for all i. SubstituteQi(si) into (11), change the order of integration and substitute
Vi(ti). After rearranging, we obtain that the truthtelling payo¤of the bidder with
the lowest signal can be written as
Vi(t) =
Z
T i
{tipi(t)  [1  i]xi(t) + i
X
j 6=i
xj(t) 
Z ti
t
pi(si; t i)dsi}f(t i)dt i
(14)
for all i and ti 2

t; t

. Since it is optimal Vi(t) = 0 for all i, then su¢ cient
conditions for (14) to hold are:
tipi(t)  [1  i]xi(t) + i
X
j 6=i
xj(t) =
Z ti
t
pi(si; t i)dsi
for all i and for all state t = (ti; t i). If we x a particular state t = (ti; t i), three
cases are possible: (i) a winning bidder exists di¤erent from bidder 3, (ii) bidder
3 is the winner, and (iii) the object is not awarded to any bidder. Applying (12)
and (13), the solution of this system of equations for the three cases yields the
desired scheme of asymmetric payments.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Using backward induction, we rst characterize the
Nash equilibrium resulting from Stage II. In this stage, bidder 2 accepts the o¤er
if t2   (1  2)2 > 0, i.e., if t2 > (1  2)2, and rejects otherwise. The sellers
problem is hence
max
2
[(1  1   2)2] [1  (1  2)2] ;
whose solution is given by 2 = 1=2(1 2). The optimal sellers expected revenue
from this stage is equal to (1  1   2)=4(1  2).
In stage I.2, bidder 1 accepts any sellers o¤er if his expected payo¤ is larger than
the expected payo¤ at the equilibrium of stage II. That is, if t1   (1   1)1 >
Et2 [1

2)] = 1=4(1   2), which is equivalent to the condition t1 > (1=4(1  
2)) + (1  1)1. Thus, the sellers optimal o¤er is characterized by
1 = argmax
1
(1  1   2)1

1  1
4(1  2)
  (1  1)1

+
1  1   2
4(1  2)

1
4(1  2)
+ (1  1)1

:
The solution is given by 1 = (5 62)=8(1 1)(1 2), which yields an optimal
sellers expected revenue equal to
SN0 =
(1  1   2)
16(1  2)2

(5  62)2
4(1  1)
+ 1

;
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and an average sale price equal to
SN0  SN0 =(1  1   2) =
1
16(1  2)2

(5  62)2
4(1  1)
+ 1

: (15)
Since 1=2 > 1  2  0, it is simple to verify that
1 =
5  62
8(1  1)(1  2)
 5  62
8(1  2)2
>
1
2(1  2)
= 2
which proves the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Since that the asymmetric case is the most general one,
we rst prove the second part of the proposition. In the second-price auction,
bidder 2s payo¤ function, when his signals is t2 and he behaves as if it were bt2, is
given by
2(t2;bt2) = maxbt2
Z b 11 (b2(bt2))
0
(t2   b1(t))dt, (16)
that is, the traditional payo¤ function in a second-price auction without toeholds.
Consequently, it follows that b2(t2) = t2. Given the bid strategies b1(:) and
b2(t2) = t2, bidder 1s optimal choice of bt1 when he observes t1 is obtained by
maximizing his expected prots
1(t1;bt1) = maxbt1
Z b1(bt1)
0
(t1   (1  1)t)dt+ 1
Z 1
b1(bt1) b1(bt1)dt: (17)
From Ettinger (2005), bidder 1s equilibrium bid is given by
b1(t1) =
1
1 + 1
+
t1
1 + 1

Now, in order to compute the sellers revenues, let us dene  j(ti), the equilibrium
correspondence function, such that bi(ti) = bj( j(ti)) for all i; j = 1; 2. Applying
the denition of  j(:) to the equilibrium bid strategies yields
 2(t1) =
1
1 + 1
+
t1
1 + 1
; (18)
 1(t2) =  1 + t2(1 + 1): (19)
Appealing to the Envelope Theorem, and using the fact that  2(:) = b1(:) and
 1(:) = b
 1
1 (b2(:)), it can be veried that
di(t1;bti)
dti
=  j(ti); which implies
i(ti) = i(1) 
Z 1
ti
 j(t)dt (20)
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for all i; j = 1; 2. Evaluating ti = 1 in (16) and (17), and using the fact that in
equilibrium  j(bti) =  j(ti) and  j(1) = 1, it can be shown that
1(1) = 1  1  1
2
(21)
2(1) =
1
2(1 + 1)
: (22)
Substituting (18), (19), and the results (21) and (22) into (20), bidder is interim
payo¤ becomes
1(t1) = 1  (1  1)
2
  (1  t
2
i )
2(1 + 1)
  1(1  t1)
(1 + 1)
2(t2) =
1
2(1 + 1)
  1 + 1 + 1
2
+
(1 + 1)t
2
2
2
  1t2:
After taking expectations, bidder is ex-ante payo¤ is given by
1 = 1  (1  1)
2
  1
3(1 + 1)
  1
2(1 + 1)
2 =
1
2(1 + 1)
+
(1 + 1)
6
  1
2
The nonbidding shareholdersexpected revenues are then given by
SPA0 =
"Z 1
0
t1
Z  2(t1)
0
dt2dt1 +
Z 1
0
t2
Z  1(t2)
0
dt1dt2
#
  1   2
=
Z 1
0
t1 2(t1)dt1 +
Z 1
0
t2 1(t2)dt2

  1   2
=
1
1 + 1
  5
6
1  
1
21 + 2
+
2
31 + 3
+
1
6
and the average selling price is
SPA0  SPA0 =(1  1) =
1
1  1

1
1 + 1
  5
6
1  
1
21 + 2
+
2
31 + 3
+
1
6

:
We now turn to demonstrate the statement for the symmetric case. From Propo-
sition 1 in Ettinger (2002), the second-price auction equilibrium bid is given by
bi(ti) =

1 + 
+
ti
1 + 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for all i. Hence,  2(t) =  1(t) = t for all t. Applying the same line of reasoning
used in the asymmetric case, it can be veried that the sellers expected revenues
are given by
SPA0 =
Z 1
0
t21dt1 +
Z 1
0
t22dt2

  2

2
3
  (1 + 2)(1  )
2(1 + )

=
(1 + 2)(1  )
(1 + )
  2
3
and the corresponding average sale price becomes
SPA0 =
(1 + 2)(1  )
(1  2)(1 + )  
2
3(1  2)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Consider the symmetric case. Substituting 1 =
2 =  into (15), and using Lemma 5.1, we can state that
SN0 =
322   56+ 25
64(1  )3 > 
SPA
0  FPA0
where the second inequality is strict when  > 0, and follows from Proposition 3
in Ettinger (2002).
Consider now the asymmetric case. Lemma 5.1 and the substitution of 1 >
2 = 0 into (15) yields
SN0 =
1
16

25
4(1  1)
+ 1

> SPA0 > 
FPA
0
where the last inequality holds as overbidding is not present in the rst-price
auction.
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